Recent scholars have broadened the study of ransnational relations from political economy to include contentious international politics. This is a refreshing trend, but most of them go directly from "globalization" or some other such process to transnational social movements and thence to a global civil society. In addition,they have so far failed to distinguish adequately among movements, non-governmental organizations and transnational networks and do not specify their relations with states and international institutions. In particular, few mechanisms are proposed to link domestic actors to transnational ones and to states and international institutions. This paper argues that mass-based transnational social movements are hard to construct, difficult to maintain, and have very different relations to states and international institutions than more routinized international NGOs or activist networks. These latter forms may be encouraged both by states and international institutions and by the growth of a cosmopolitan class of transnational activists. Rather than being seen as the antipodes of transnational contention, international institutions offer resources, opportunities and incentives for the formation of actors in transnational politics. . If transnational social movements form it will be through a second-stage process of domestication of international conflict.
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FROM THE OLD TO THE NEW TRANSNATIONALISM
The last three decades have seen a paradigm shift in the way political scientists and others have looked at transnational politics. Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane -who popularized the term in the early 1970s -were reacting against the "realist" paradigm in international relations (1971: 372-379) . In that well-known paradigm, international organizations "are merely instruments of governments, and therefore unimportant in their own right" (1974:39) . Nye and Keohane criticized the realist approach and its assumption that states are unitary actors, and proposed an alternative one -what they called the world politics paradigm: (1971:379-395) . Their work triggered a debate that has gone through many phases in international relations theory since then.
Realism -with its emphasis on states as the only important actors in international politics --has remained the stated or unstated target of much of the field of transnational politics. This fixation is unfortunate, since it has made it difficult for students of transnational politics to assess the role of states without looking over their shoulder at the realists (Risse 2000:2) . For example, few analysts since Huntington have made much of the fact that the world's remaining hegemon has a concept of international relations that is fully congruent with its dominant pluralist model of domestic politics (but see Uvin 2000).
The debate on transnational politics has taken several stages. After, first, focussing in their edited book Transnational Relations and World Politics, on all forms of transnational activity ("contacts, coalitions, and interaction across state boundaries that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of governments", 1971:xi), Keohane and Nye narrowed the concept of transnationalism to the international activities of nongovernmental actors (1974:41) -distinguishing these from "transgovernmental actors" --a term they now use to refer to "sub-units of governments on those occasions when they act relatively autonomously from higher authority in international politics" (p. 41) -and from "international organizations", which they define as "multilevel linkages, norms, and institutions between governments prescribing behavior in particular situations."
Though it was tighter than their original one, even Keohane and Nye's sharpened 1974 concept of "transnational relations" covered a lot of ground. It was useful in directing attention to "the tremendous increase in the number and significance of private international interactions in recent decades and the much larger and diverse number of private individuals and groups engaging in such interactions" (Huntington: 335). But it had three unfortunately narrowing effects:
• First, since their work coincided with the discovery, or rediscovery, of the field of international political economy, this influenced scholars to focus mainly on transnational economic relations and, in particular, on the multinational corporation. Indeed, many of the contributions to Transnational Relations and World Politics did exactly that. Even Keohane's 1996 reader with Helen Milner is limited largely to economic relations (Keohane and Milner 1996) . To the extent that students of transnational relations looked at contentious politics, it was thus usually in the form of resistance to transnational economic penetration (Arrighi and Silver 1984; Walton 1989) ; to the extent that they studied states' internal politics, it was mainly through foreign economic policy-making. This political economy focus distracted scholars from recognizing until recently that much of transnational organizing deals with political and humanitarian issues like refugees, violence against women and children, and human rights (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink eds, 1999 ) .
• Nye and Keohane recognized transnational contention only under the narrow heading of the diffusion of ideas and attitudes, treating them separately from their more sustained discussion of "international pluralism" -by which they meant "the linking of national interest groups in transnational structures, usually involving transnational organizations for purposes of coordination " (1971:xviii) . This disjunction of transnational contention from transnational nongovernmental organizations has persisted (Jacobson 2000); as a result, there was no integration between the field of transnational politics and the growing field of contentious politics until the 1990s, and some IR specialists, despite their interest in "global social movements" barely draw on this literature (O'Brien, et al., eds., 2000) .
• 
Sociological Institutionalism
We can deal briefly with the Stanford school of institutional sociology (see Boli and
Thomas ed., 1999) for a full treatment and bibliography). Early in the 1980s, coming out of a world systems perspective, John Meyer observed that institutions and the norms that they embody are frequently observed in widely dispersed parts of the world. World systems theorists had noticed this too but assigned responsibility for it to the profit-making needs of core capitalism. Meyer found isomorphism in so many sectors of human activity -from educational institutions to welfare systems to state structures --that he detached the phenomenon from capitalism and assigned it to a global process of rationalization. (Loya 2000) . For the most part, however, the Stanford school has contributed more to our knowledge of the commonalities of norms and institutions between borders than to our understanding of the social mechanisms and political processes that cross them.
Domestic Structures and Transnational Relations
Meanwhile, new work by international relations specialists focussing on domestic
sgtructures attempted to open the field of transnational politics beyonod the old realist/nonrealist dabate (Risse-Kappen, ed. 1995) . Risse-Kappen and his colleagues revived attention to "transgovernmental politics" (see especially the chapter by Cameron); they included transnational economic relations but also went beyond them; and they related transnational politics to international institutions and domestic politics. Two changes in particular were notable, both in their book and in the new literature that followed it: first, a deliberate attempt to deal with the intersections between transnational relations and "domestic structure"; second, a more normatively charged concept of transnational relations.
Nye and can pose formidable obstacles to transnational actors once they gain a purchase; conversely, the "closed" Soviet system was harder for transnational arms control advocates to access butonce contacts were established -they could have great impact (Evangelista 1995; .
There were three main weaknesses in the "domestic structure" argument:
• First, it was extremely generic, including elements as general as "political culture," "openness" (eg., openness to whom?) and pluralism
• Second, it could not predict why some transnational actors operating in the same context succeed while others fail (cf., Keck and Sikkink 1998: 202) • Third, it made no clear distinctions between different types of transnational actorsindifferently lumping INGOs, social movements, and transnational advocacy networks together.
Those who followed Risse-Kappen and his colleagues after 1995 offered a partial answer to these problems: with a constructivist turn that focussed attention on the resonance between transnational goals and domestic norms.
The Normative Turn
The move towards norms in the study of transnational activism was part of a more general discovery of "constructivism" by IR scholars in the 1990s (Risse 2000:2) . 2 In various areas of international relations, norms were defined as "a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity" (P. Katzenstein 1996: 5) . This re-kindled the controvesy with realism but gave it a new twist (Checkel 1997). If norms could be shown to have an autonomous role in structuring international debate irrespective of the policies of strong states, and it could be shown that interests are constituted and reconstituted around learning, normdiffusion, and identity shift, then non-state factors in transnational space could be shown to have teeth -and not only hegemonic states.
Much creative work has grown out of the concern with norms and identities in the international system:
2 For a review and some stimulating hypotheses, see Finnemore and Sikkink 1998 . Also see Finnemore 1996 , Katzenstein 1996 , Klotz 1995 , Price 1997 and Thomas forthcoming.
• First, transnational normative consensus could be shown to result in international agreements that were capable of constraining state behavior (Klotz 1995; Price 1997).
• Second, international normative agreements could create political opportunities for domestic actors living under governments which would otherwise be reluctant to tolerate dissidence (Thomas forthcoming, Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999).
• Third, even where international normative consensus was lacking, strong states could endow international institutions with the authority to enforce behavior consistent with these norms -as in the U.N. and NATO interventions in Yugoslavia.
• Fourth, norms could contribute to the construction of new identities, which -in some cases -could bridge national identities, providing a normative basis for transnational coalitions or principled issue networks. Third, the assumption of normative consensus underlying much of this work is challenged by the often-contested nature of international norms. Finally, if norms are more than the result of contingent coalitions of interest, it will have to be shown that they are actually translated into state policies (Fox 1999; Risse 1999) . Like sociological institutionalism, the normative turn is better at mapping changes in world culture than in tracing the mechanisms through which transnational factors influence domestic politics.
These three developments in the study of transnational politics have had an unexpected benefit: helping to provide a bridge between international relations scholars and a previously-distinct tradition --the field of contentious politics. In the 1980s and early 1990s, this group of scholars had already absorbed and profited from constructivism (Melucci 1988 (Melucci , 1996 Snow et al 1986) ; it also had a well-grounded tradition of studying the impact of domestic structures of opportunity and constraint on social movements (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, eds. 1996; Tarrow 1998) ; and increasingly, social movement scholars were becoming conscious of transnational and international influences on transnational contentious politics (McAdam 1998; Tarrow 1998: ch. 11; Tilly 1993 ). Let us turn to this tradition's contributions to the new transnational politics.
CONTENTIOUS TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS
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The marriage between social movement and international relations scholars was scattered but dramatic. It had four main sources in real-world politics: grassroots insurgencies, institutions.
An important source of data came from former activists, who brought energy, real-time information and commitment to studying contention to the field. They also brought perspectives from comparative politics, cultural anthropology, and sociology to a field that had been restricted to professional international relations specialists until then. From the early 1990s
on, a creative cross-fertilization began to develop between IR specialists interested in transnational relations and social movement scholars interested in transnational contention.
The new work can be divided roughly into five groupings, with some overlap between them:
• Some examined the development of a wide spectrum of non-state actors who organized transnationally (Boli and Thomas eds., 1999; della Porta, Kriesi and Rucht, eds., 1999 , Keck and Sikkink 1998 , O'Brien, et al., eds., 2000 Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco, eds. 1997; Stiles, ed., 1996) ;
• Others focussed on particular movement families --like the peace movement (Rochon 1998 ) human rights and democratization (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999; Loya 2000) • Others studied international treaties which either legitimated and provided resources to nonstate actors (Thomas forthcoming), or in which activists played a constitutive role (Price 1997), or against which they mobilized (Ayres 1998);
• And some looked at particular binational or regional contention in the context of meanings of globalization is an important tool for organizers trying to mobilize scattered followers into social movements, permitting them to access broader frames and target distant enemies. But its adoption by scholars has had two unfortunate effects: fostering insensitivity to the regional -and certainly not "global" --scope of much transnational activity;
and producing a conceptual confusion between the global framing of an activity and the empirical scope of the activity (see the critique in Tarrow 1998:ch. 11).
Second, coming to the field from a commitment to the goals of particular social movement sectors -especially from the peace, the environment, feminist and indigenous rights movements --many students saw the universe of non-state actors through the lens of "their" particular sector. They also tended to focus on "good" movements -like the peace or human 
Transnational Social Movements
Though some investigators define social movements in terms of their "social change goals" (Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco 1997), this opens them to the danger of including institutionalized, passive, and service-oriented groups within their definition. The danger can be seen in the case of so-called "European social movements" that operate in Brussels., which often turn out to be tame, EU-subsidized lobbies (Imig and Tarrow, eds. forthcoming). There is a solution to this definitional puzzle: to define social movements -not in terms of their goalswhich they share with many non-social movements --but in terms of the kinds of actions in which they routinely engage --contentious politics --which I define as Social movements are a particularly congealed form of contention within this universe which I define as:
Socially mobilized groups engaged in sustained contentious interaction with powerholders in which at least one actor is either a target or a participant.
To be transnational, a social movement ought to have social and political bases outside its target state or society; but to be a social movement, it ought to be clearly rooted within social networks in more than one state and engage in contentious politics in which at least one state is a party to the interaction. This produces a definition of transnational social movements as Socially mobilized groups with constituents in at least two states, engaged in sustained contentious interaction with powerholders in at least one state other than their own, or against an international institution, or a multinational economic actor.
The strategic advantage of this definition is that it will allow us to observe the behavior of groups as they interact with other groups and institutions, examine as an empirical question the relations among social movements and other institutional forms and trace potential transitions between these various forms. The major other forms are INGOs and transnational advocacy networks.
International Non-Governmental Organizations
A truism of transnational politics is that international nongovernmental organizations are growing rapidly. John Boli and George M. Thomas enumerate nearly 6,000 INGOs founded between 1875 and 1988 (1999:20 INGOs as "the primary organizational field in which world culture takes structural form" (p. 6),
as "transnational bodies exercising a special type of authority we call rational voluntarism" (p.
14), and groups whose "primary concern is enacting, codifying, modifying, and propagating world-cultural structures and principles" (p. 6 Evelyn Bush points out that the Union for International Associations, the major source of data on transnational associations, has recently urged that the term INGO be dropped for "transnational associational network", since the former includes so many mixed, intersect organizations including various degrees of governmental involvement. I retain the term because it is in common usage. 
Transnational Activist Networks
Except for their service activities -where they are normally independent --INGOs frequently operate in temporary or long-term alliances with other actors, both state and nonstate, transnational and domestic -to advance their policy goals. This has added a new and dynamic category to the study of transnational politics -transnational activist networks. As Keck and Sikkink define it A transnational advocacy network includes those relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services (1998:2).
Such networks, continue Keck and Sikkink, "are most prevalent in issue areas characterized by high value content and informational uncertainty" (ibid: p.2). They thus draw on the "normative turn" in international relations theory described above -with special relevance to such heavily-normative areas as human rights (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999) .
Transnational advocacy networks are not alternatives to social movements or INGOs;
on the contrary, they can contain them, in the loose way that networks contain anything -as well as containing governmental agents in either their official or unofficial capacities. They are the informal and shifting structures through which NGOs, social movement activists, government officials, and agents of international institutions can interact and help resource-poor domestic actors to gain leverage in their own societies. In Keck and Sikkink's model, resource-rich NGOs --working through either their own states, international institutions, or both -try to activate a transnational network to put pressure on target state. Keck and Sikkink's "boomerang" effect illustrates the potential relationships within these networks (1998: 13).
At this stage, Keck and Sikkink's important work suggests a number of research problems:
• It is unclear how they see TANs relating to the existing state system. Do their operations depend incidentally -or fundamentally --on the power of the states they come from?The majority of their member groups come from the wealthy states of the North; does the power of these states lie behind the capacity of network activists to persuade other states to accede to the claims of resource-weak allies within them?
• Most of the empirical work on TANS has been oriented to highly normatively-oriented groups; does the same logic of coalition-building and deployment of the power of third party states and/or international institutions occur when the basis of support is material interest?
• While the argument from international institutions seems parallel to the "global civil society thesis, it differs in three important ways: first, it specifies an increase of transnational contention through the resources, incentives and opportunities of international institutionsand not directly through "globalization." Second, it also offers an explanation for the wide variations we see between sectors of transnational activity. As Thomas Risse argues, "the higher the degree of international institutionalization in a given issue-area, the greater the policy impact of transnational actors" (1995, 2000:27) Third, it makes problematic and nondeterministic the growth of transnational activism.
An institutional approach to transnational contention suggests several mechanisms through which domestic activists can find one another, gain legitimation, form collective identities, and go back to their countries empowered with alliances, common programs and new repertoires of collective action. We can identify at least four such mechanisms: brokerage, certification, modeling, and institutional appropriation. These terms need some elementary definition:
• By brokerage I mean making connections between otherwise unconnected domestic actors in a way that produces at least a temporary political identity that did not exist before (Smith
2000)
• by certification, I mean the recognition of the identities and legitimate public activity of either new actors or actors new to a particular cite of activity
• by modeling, I mean the adoption of norms, forms of collective action or organization in one venue that have been demonstrated in another
• by institutional appropriation, I mean the use of an institution's resources or reputation to serve the purposes of affiliated groups.
No single international institution is going to provide the mechanisms to facilitate all of these steps (indeed, most of them fall well short of that threshold). But the list provided above can help scholars to begin to specify the ways in which non-state actors with weak resources and opportunities in their own societies can develop transnational ties that can be "boomeranged" on behalf of their own claims.
CONCLUSIONS
International institutions serve as a kind of "coral reef", helping to forge horizontal links among activists with similar claims across boundaries. 6 This leads to the paradox that international institutions --created by states, and usually by powerful ones --can be the arenas in which transnational contention is most likely to form against states. I do not maintain that states create international institutions in order to encourage contention; states are more likely to delegate than to fuse sovereignty. But because international institutions seek autonomy as they mediate among the interests of competing states, they can provide political opportunities for weak domestic social actors, encouraging their connections with others like themselves, and offering resources that can be used in intra-national and transnational conflict. We see a highly- Third, what are the analytical stakes in this growing area of research? Provided researchers can be convinced to define their terms precisely and consistently and relate these actors and agencies to one another over time, we may be able to answer the question that is too often taken as an assumption in the literature: "Is there a trend towards non-territorial governance in the world system, and if there is, will it take an interstate, a supranational or a civil-society dominated form?" 7 For example, in the European Union, states increasingly serve as pivots between domestic groups and European institutions; this looks less like a "global civil society" than a multilevel or a composite polity (Imig and Tarrow eds., forthcoming).
A final provocative thought: if the process of "transnationalization" described above is robust, then a global civil society will not come about as the result of domestic groups moving outward from their societies and replacing government with governance; but from the reflux of their activities around state-created international institutions back on domestic contention, institutions, and identities. And if that is the case, then the distinction between international relations and domestic politics will really need to be challenged!
